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Abstract  
The “property question” is the constitutional question whether a society’s basic resources are 
to be publicly or privately owned; that is, whether these basic resources are to be available to 
private owners, perhaps subject to tax and regulation, or whether instead they are to be 
retained in joint public ownership, and managed by democratic processes.  James Madison’s 
approach represents a case in which prior holdings are taken for granted, and the property 
question itself is kept off of the political agenda.  By contrast, John Rawls approach abstracts 
from any actual pattern of holdings, while putting the property question on the political 
agenda, but at a particular place.  This paper compares and contrasts the two approaches.  
Two unpublished lectures by Rawls—one of them directed at Madison— are included as an 
appendix.  
 I thank Roberto Merrill, Daniele Santoro, and Alan Thomas for an opportunity to present this paper.  An 1
early draft was presented at the Inaugural Property and Political Economy Conference at the Smith Institute, 
Chapman University, Orange, California, April 20-21, 2018.
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Introduction 
By the expression, “the property question,” I mean the question whether a society’s basic 
resources are to be publicly or privately owned.  More precisely, I mean the question 
whether these basic resources are to be available to private owners, perhaps subject to tax 
and regulation, or whether instead they are to be retained in joint public ownership, and 
managed by some democratic process. 
By “society’s basic resources” I mean things like land, mineral deposits, waterways, roads, 
transportation systems, airspace, the broadcast spectrum, the financial system, major 
industrial facilities, and so forth —what have been called the means of production.  The term 
“the means of production” has to be understood as implicitly qualified.  It refers not to every 
tool or utensil that could be put to productive use—every hammer or paintbrush—but only 
to those resources that belong to society’s basic structure.  What these assets are is subject to 
contingencies of time and place.  Coal mining, for example, was one of the means of 
production in Great Britain in 1945, but is no longer.  The internet did not exist in 1945, but 
almost everywhere it is a practical necessity for leading a productive life today.  2
By “ownership” I mean the usual incidents of property ownership: centrally, the exclusive 
right to control an asset and the exclusive right to revenues and other accruals of value to 
that asset.  In many cases, the prospects of a monetary return to the owner of an asset will 
determine whether and how it will be put to use.  Privately held assets are typically deployed 
in the way and on the terms thought likeliest to return the highest profit to the owner.  By 
contrast, publicly held assets are ideally —if not typically— deployed in order to achieve 
some public purpose. 
Reasonable minds can come to different conclusions on the property question, and these 
conclusions are often invested with some emotion.  There are venues where the property 
question would be tactless to raise.  At the Thanksgiving dinner table, for example.  Other 
venues, such as this one, are ideal.  But the property question is a political question, and here 
is a good place to deliberate out loud about how this momentous question should be 
addressed politically.  That is my subject: how and where should the property question come 
into political discussion in a constitutional democracy. 
As with so many topics in political philosophy, it is useful to begin by looking at the 
extremes.  The extreme views are typically the simplest, and often also the clearest, at least 
initially.  One extreme view is that the property question is always apt for the political 
  A capitalist class “cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production,” Marx 2
and Engels surmised in The Communist Manifesto of 1848.
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agenda.  On this view, majoritarian decisionmaking about whether the means of production 
are to be publicly or privately held is always legitimate, if not always wise.  The other 
extreme view is that the property question does not ever belong on the political agenda, at 
least not as a matter of ordinary legislation.  The property question is not only unwise to 
entrust to democratic decisionmaking, it is illegitimate and unjust to do so. 
The contrast I just drew is orthogonal to another.  We could pose the property question 
abstractly, as if there were no antecedent, historically delivered allocation.  Or, alternatively, 
we could pose the question in a historical situation.  On the latter approach, the means of 
production might already be found in private hands or already in public ownership.  I 
simplify the latter case by ignoring the possibility that some kind of mixture of public and 
private ownership of productive means has established itself.  The simplification makes it 
possible to isolate four basic cases: 
Figure 1. 
To move the discussion along, I have taken the liberty of populating only two of the four 
squares, and only provisionally.  James Madison’s approach represents a case in which prior 
holdings are taken for granted, and the property question itself is kept off of the political 
agenda, as I will explain more fully.  By contrast, John Rawls approach —at least initially, in 
what he calls “ideal theory”— prescinds from any actual pattern of holdings; and Rawls’s 
approach puts the property question on the political agenda, but at a particular place, which 
I will also explain more fully.  I now take up these two representative figures in turn, before 
bringing them together —“into conversation” so to speak. 
I. Madison 
The task that the framers of the US Constitution took up was to draw up a charter of 
federation for a number of already loosely confederated but sovereign states, the thirteen 
former colonies of Great Britain.  The property question —though not yet ripe—seemed 
already settled: private ownership was the norm in the several states.  Commercial activity 
had yet to progress much beyond what Marx called “primitive accumulation,” and productive 
activity on “an industrial scale” was still in is infancy.  (I leave aside the great tobacco, indigo, 
cotton, and rice manufactories of the South.)  One question that troubled the framers was 
On the political 
agenda
Off the political 
agenda
Tabula rasa Rawls, Rousseau
Prior holdings Madison, Locke
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whether the form of government would tend to threaten the pre-existing patterns of 
ownership.  
  
Although private ownership was the norm, it was controversial whether chattel slavery 
would be recognized throughout what was proposed to be the United States.  Another 
concern was the sanctity of private debt.  Yet another was public acquisition of private assets.   
The Constitution addressed each of these.  The Great Compromise on slavery left that 
“peculiar institution” in place in the Southern states.  The “takings” clause of the fifth 
amendment provided that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”  Mere confiscation of the means of production is disallowed.  The bare 
possibility of nationalizing the means of production can only be achieved by putting massive 
amounts of liquid capital into the hands of private expropriates.  The expropriated are 
encouraged to become creditors, protected at the state level by the “contracts” clause of 
Article I, which forbids the states to “impair the obligation of contracts.”  In Federalist 10, 
Madison gave assurances that a central principle of the design of the federal sovereign was to 
protect private property from the depredations of popular majorities. 
The framers framed a republic and a res publica is a public thing.  The Constitution provides 
that certain productive means are to be held publicly: the post office, the navigable 
waterways,  and the mint.  I cut short the discussion here, since its purpose is merely to 3
illustrate in a broad and inexact way how a theorist of government might work from the 
assumption of the justice —or even the sanctity— of a pre-existing pattern of private 
ownership, and so regard the theorist’s task as limited to that of introducing a principle of 
popular sovereignty in a way that would not instantly unsettle that pattern.  Madison is not 
the best possible example because in his America, at least in theory, socialism is possible —
by “socialism” I mean public ownership of the entirety of the means of production most vital 
to the republic.  But what is possible to decide legislatively is also possible to reverse 
legislatively.  Should the means of production fall into public ownership, a reversal is never 
more than an election away.  Madison’s design does not entrench private ownership of 
productive means quite as deeply as it does the equal representation of the states in the 
Senate.  But nearly so. 
One might deny that the Constitution leaves even this small an opening for democratic 
socialism.  It is possible to look to John Locke and the ninth amendment for help in driving it 
shut.  To Locke, for a natural right to acquire and hold private property that is not 
surrendered at the door to civil society.  To the ninth amendment —“The enumeration in the 
  See Gilman v. Philadelphia (1866)(interpreting the commerce clause of Art. I as rendering “the navigable 3
waters of the United States. . . . the public property of the nation”). Brad Loveall brought this case to my 
attention.
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Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained 
by the people”—to bolster the position that public ownership of productive means cannot 
stand in as an all-purpose “public use” under the takings clause.  However this view works 
out, it appears intended to keep public ownership of the means of production off political 
agenda, once and for all—more firmly so than in Madison’s design.  
II. Rawls 
John Rawls distinguished the theory of justice from the theory of government, and his career 
was devoted almost entirely to the former.  His theory of justice, which he called justice as 
fairness, was an attempt to extend the social contract tradition in a way that makes sparing 
use of certain fundamental ideas already embedded in our public political culture: society 
conceived as a fair cooperative productive system for mutual advantage; society well-ordered 
by a common principles that are a public basis for the justification of political power; citizens 
conceived as free and equal.    
The most distinctive of Rawls’s ideas is that of an original position in which principles are 
chosen to govern the basic structure of society.  In this original position, rational, self-
interested parties are deprived of knowledge that would enable them to pick principles 
designed to favor their own situation, or temperament, or conception of the good.  If the 
choice question is well-posed, what can emerge from behind this veil of ignorance is a set of 
principles of justice that are capable of well-ordering a society, furnishing a shared, public 
basis for the use of public power, a basis that offers a justification to each citizen for the 
restrictions of liberty that social cooperation inevitably requires.  This shared, political 
conception of justice can stabilize a diverse society in conditions of pluralism —no small 
thing, given that a society so conceived cannot be held together by a shared religion or 
comprehensive moral view; for, given what he calls the “fact of reasonable pluralism,” no 
such basis could be maintained without violating the fundamental liberty of conscience. 
There are many contrasts we could make between John Rawls’s approach and James 
Madison’s.  I want to focus on only a few.  The first has to do with the existing pattern of 
holdings in society.  Madison took this as a given, and the task was to impose a federal  
political sovereign in a way that was acceptable to those who already held title within that 
pattern.  Rawls’s approach prescinds entirely from the existing pattern of entitlements of all 
kinds: not just of ownership of things but of endowments of all kinds: strength, intelligence, 
looks, personal virtues, and so on.  The question for decision in the original position is, what 
principled basis for the division of the product of social cooperation would be fair—that is, 
what principled basis would be chosen by rational and reasonable parties if they had no 
knowledge of what special advantages they might have or gain? 
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Rawls’s answer, in part, was that the parties would choose principles that would give each a 
right to bodily integrity and a right to acquire and own personal property –  including “ at 
least certain forms of real property, such as dwellings and private grounds,” without which a 
citizen would lack “a sufficient material basis for personal independence and a sense of self-
respect” (JF 114  n. 36).   But the parties would not be determined to choose either of two 4
“wider” principles.  One wider principle would guarantee each a right to acquire and own 
basic means of production.  Another wider principle would guarantee each a right as a joint 
owner of society’s basic means of production.  We can call these two proposals, respectively, 
“wide private property” and “socialism.”  Neither would be compelling in the original 
position because, Rawls says, 
These wider conceptions of property are not used because they cannot, I think, be 
accounted for as necessary for the development and full exercise of the moral 
powers. 
The “two moral powers” of citizens conceived as free and equal are, one, the power to form, 
revise, and pursue a conception of the good, and, two, the power to form and adhere to a sense 
of justice.  Although the conception of good may be purely personal, the “sense of justice” 
Rawls speaks of is a shared possession if it exists at all.  Rawls continues: 
The merits of these and other conceptions of the right of property are decided at 
later stages when much more information about a society’s circumstances 
and historical traditions is available.  (PL 298, and cf. JF 114) 
So, the property question is on the agenda in the original position, but it is undecidable.  The 
rule of decision is unanimity, and the general knowledge available behind the veil of 
ignorance is insufficient to determine the question.   If the parties choose on the basis of a 
comprehensive conception of justice, such as Locke’s, or Saint-Simon’s, then the property 
question would be determinable and decided in favor of wide private property, for a 
Lockean, or socialism, for a Saint-Simoniste.  But the veil of ignorance does not allow access 
to comprehensive religious, moral, or philosophical conceptions.  
  
What about these “later stages” at which the property question can be and is to be decided?  
This is a reference to the “four-stage sequence” that takes us from the original position to a 
second, constitutional stage, to a third, legislative stage, and to a fourth and final 
 Citations to Rawls’s works are abbreviated: TJ = A Theory of Justice, 1999 rev. ed.; PL = Political Liberalism, 4
1996 paperback ed.;  CP = Collected Papers, Samuel Freeman, ed. 1999;  JF = Justice as Fairness: a Restatement, 
2001; LN = Rawls’s Philosophy 171 Lecture Notes, Theory of Democracy, Fall 1971 (unpublished, Lectures XVII and 
XVIII are appended). 
!7
administrative/adjudicative stage.  The idea is that an adequate theory of justice must state 
principles governing the basic structure, but these principles cannot themselves determine 
the answer of each question of governance.  The veil has to be relaxed even to state the vast 
bulk of issues that must be settled if social cooperation is to be productive.  But deliberation 
and decision at the later stages are confined within and guided by the two principles that 
emerge from the original position.  The two principles are ordered lexically, meaning that 
the prior principles cannot be compromised to advance the posterior principles.  They are: 
First principle: a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, including liberty of 
conscience, fair-valued equal political liberty, and the right to bodily integrity and 
personal property.   
Second principle: two in sequence: fair equality of opportunity, and the difference 
principle. 
Notice that the most potent egalitarianism of justice as fairness is housed in the first-
principle guarantee of fair-valued political liberty, which means a roughly equal political 
influence at comparable levels of motivation and articulateness.  The difference principle 
permits unlimited inequality so long as all benefit in terms of their absolute holding of 
primary goods.    The fair-value guarantee assures that material inequality does not translate 5
into unequal political influence, and thus that economic inequality cannot seem so excessive 
as call into doubt the justice of the basic structure. 
    
Rawls confessed that prior even to the first principle would be a principle guaranteeing a 
social minimum.  This was implicit anyway in the way he set up the original position.  But 
Rawls took specific exception to including a right to workplace democracy in this set (PL 
6-7). 
III. Rawls on the Constitutional Stage 
I want to focus on the constitutional stage.  Here is where we can imagine Rawls comparing 
notes with Madison.  Rawls speaks more often of natural duties than of natural rights, but it 
would not be outrageous to imagine Rawls explaining himself to Madison using such 
language.   Both gentlemen believed that justice requires certain political rights and certain 6
  “Forty years later, to most nonspecialists ‘Rawlsianism’ is the difference principle,” Fried (2014, 430).  The 5
widespread fixation on the difference principle may have had the effect of encouraging trends that Rawls 
deplored.  See Reiff (2012, 119-35). 
  Rawls cheerfully says, “justice as fairness has the characteristic marks of a natural rights theory” (TJ 443 n.6
30).
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property rights.  Call them natural rights, if only to emphasize that a just constitution has got 
to protect these rights from majoritarian infringement.  
The property question, framed in terms of the basic means of production, would not have 
been salient in Madison’s thinking.  The factory system that Marx and Engels responded to 
had yet to arrive in America.  Indeed, in 1789 it had only begun to take hold in the English 
Midlands.  In Rawls’s case, the property question could not be avoided.  Political philosophy, 
in his view, is a cumulative undertaking, guided by a sense of natural piety that demands 
attention to the thought of earlier generations and ages.  Once the unfolding of history has 
uncovered the property question, it cannot be set aside unless political philosophy concludes 
it lacks the resources to give an answer.   
In the restatement of his theory of justice as fairness, Rawls put a new task on the agenda of 
the constitutional convention, the second stage of the four-stage sequence.  Rawls defined 
five ideal regime-types, and called on the constitutional convention to choose between them.  
The five are: 
laissez-faire capitalism, 
welfare-state capitalism, 
one-party, “command” socialism, 
property-owning democracy, and 
liberal (democratic) socialism (JF 136). 
Rawls stated that the constitutional convention would reject each of the first three.  Laissez-
faire capitalism accepts formal but not fair political equality, and rejects the second principle 
altogether.  One-party socialism rejects fair political equality and liberty of occupation.   
The surprise, for many, may be that Rawls expressly rejected welfare-state capitalism as a 
possible realization of justice as fairness.   Welfare-state capitalism is defined, for this 7
purpose, as a regime in which fair political equality is not guaranteed, and the difference 
principle is replaced with a social minimum set at a high-enough level to forestall unrest.  
  This was hinted at but not stated in the Preface to the 1999 Revised Edition of Theory (TJ xiv-xvi).  Rawls 7
said he regretted not having “distinguished more sharply” between a property-owning democracy and a 
welfare state, both of which allow private ownership of the means of production.  He distinguished the 
former as having the aim of securing fair value, and noted that the latter “may allow” unequal accumulations 
of wealth “incompatible with the fair value of the political liberties” (TJ xv).  That was about all.  The Preface 
is dated 1990, but a draft of what was to emerge as the Restatement (the “Guided Tour”) had been already 
circulating as early as 1989.  In the draft, Rawls plainly stated that welfare-state capitalism could safely be 
assumed to be unable to realize justice as fairness.  This may be an instance of the “muffled and cramped” 
style of expression that Burton Dreben chided Rawls about.
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The institutions of a welfare-state capitalist society would therefore not be designed to 
realize the  principle of reciprocity underlying fair political equality and the difference 
principle.  Lacking that aim, institutions could not be assumed to be capable of satisfying it 
through the operation of some invisible hand. 
That leaves socialism and what he called property-owning democracy as the only remaining 
institutional contenders.  They differ only in how they answer the property question.  Both 
are designed to realize justice as fairness, but a property-owning democracy leaves the 
property question on the political agenda of ordinary legislation, the third stage of the four-
stage sequence, while democratic socialism does not.  A democratic socialist regime will 
maintain the means of production as a publicly owned asset, and will not entertain legislative 
proposals to privatize that asset.  Note that what has already been ruled out is the alternative 
of constitutionally excluding public ownership of the means of production.   The decision 
between the two ideal regime-types completes his answer to the property question.  What is 
the decision?  Rawls says, 
When a practical decision is to be made between property-owning democracy and a 
liberal socialist regime, we look to a society’s historical circumstances, to its 
traditions of political thought and practice, and much else. Justice as fairness does not 
decide between these regimes but tries to set out guidelines for how the decision can 
reasonably be approached. (JF 139; emphasis added) 
The language might be taken to indicate that Rawls concluded that a constitutional 
convention might reasonably choose either to leave the property question to be decided by 
ordinary legislation and it might also reasonably choose to take the property question off the 
agenda of ordinary legislation.  Alternatively, it might be taken to indicate that —having 
looked at historical circumstances, traditions, and “much else”— the guidelines of public 
reason should lead to a single reasonable resolution. 
The structure of Rawls’s theory firmly distinguishes ideal and non-ideal theory, and Rawls 
repeatedly insists on focussing on the former.  He also insists that the theory of justice is to 
be distinguished from what properly belongs to “political sociology” or a “theory of the 
political system” (TJ 199).  Nonetheless, the property question seems unavoidable. 
It is . . . important to trace out, if only in a rough and ready way, the institutional 
content of the two principles of justice. We need to do this before we can endorse 
these principles, even provisionally. (JF 136; my emphasis) 
The constitutional stage is unavoidably one that commingles questions of ideal and non-ideal 
theory.  Once the parties in the original position have settled on principles for the basic 
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structure, they do not then change their imputed psychology, but they come to know facts 
about their society’s history and situation.  This revelation will of course (how could it not?) 
force upon the parties a knowledge of existing patterns of holdings —though not of their 
own place in it.  Some holdings, such as chattel slavery, must be abolished outright.  
Historically, feudalism will have departed and industrialization will be about to arrive, or 
have arrived.  The means of production will appear already in the hands of owners —private 
owners operating under public charter, quite possibly.   And the property question will 
appear not upon tabula rasa but on a historical record that perhaps must be rectified. 
It would be ungenerous to depict Rawls as restating the property question only to go on to 
sweep it under the rug.  If, at the constitutional stage, the parties discover the means of 
production already to be in public hands, I think Rawls’s guidelines of public reason would 
require not only that they remain there, but that privatization be excluded from the 
legislative agenda.  This is especially so for means of production that constitute what are 
called “natural monopolies,” which are such that competition to satisfy demand would be 
wasteful.  A less obvious case is productive land.  If land is publicly held it might reasonably 
be proposed to distribute ownership equitably among citizens as private freeholders, as a 
means to fortifying that sense of independence and self-worth that justifies the right to 
acquire and hold real residential property.  But what of the incident of alienability?  If 
productive land were privatized and freely alienable, that would create the possibility of its 
accumulation in few hands.   
Suppose, instead, that the parties at the constitutional stage discover that the major means of 
production already in existence are privately owned.  The parties’ general knowledge tells 
them that this pattern entails significant economic inequality whose continuation endangers 
political equality and fair equality of opportunity.   The danger might be met by a legislative 
strategy of insulating politics from money —but it is probably too late.  The problem is one 
of transition —but to what?  Ideal theory must be the guide, but it is as yet incomplete.  One 
path would break up over-large holdings into smaller, less dominant private holdings: the 
goal being to evenly distribute ownership of productive means across the population.  This is 
the aim of a property-owning democracy.  A different path would be to take the means of 
production into public ownership.  This is socialism.  
  
Are the two goals equally eligible, in Rawls’s system?  They are not, although Rawls was 
reluctant to say so.  Justice as fairness must prefer socialism.   To indicate why, I will start 8
  Alan Thomas takes the opposite position opposite in Thomas 2017.  His case must be answered, but I 8
cannot do justice to it in these pages.
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with some interesting remarks Rawls made in his unpublished 1971 lectures on Madison.   9
Rawls revered the thinkers of the tradition he saw himself as merely continuing, and he 
lectured on Hobbes, Hume, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Mill, and Marx.  He was 
determined to build a theory of justice on the basis of what we find in our public political 
culture, especially the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and court decisions.  
But, apart from a few mentions of Madison on the establishment clause (CP 602, 620; PL liv, 
406, 408 n),   Rawls published nothing about our nation’s most important political thinker. 10
In print, Rawls said not a peep about the Madison of Federalist 10: “the dangers to the holders 
of property can not be disguised, if they are undefended against a majority without 
property.”  This odd fact makes these 1971 lectures even more interesting. 
Rawls was fascinated by the apparent parallel between efficiency as the goal of economic 
theory and justice as the goal of political theory.  Economic theory had a feature that he 
found very attractive.  In a market economy that satisfies certain assumptions, the goal of 
efficiency is simply achieved without effort by anyone.  The market achieves what Rawls 
called the “artificial identification of interests” (cf. TJ 49 & n.3, 173), by which he meant that 
the ideally specified market was a case of pure procedural efficiency.  Could political theory 
proceed the same way, as the economic theory of democracy suggested?  Rawls believed not.  
The political process is unlike market in that the political goal, justice, requires a “moral 
identification of interests.”  In other words, the political process, however idealized, cannot 
be a case of perfect procedural justice.  At best, a theory of justice might succeed in 
rendering certain aspects of justice as matters of pure procedural justice; that is, as answers 
that can be defended simply by reference to the process by which they were derived.  There 
is no independent standard that the outcome of a fair gamble need meet.  If the gamble is set 
up fairly, then the outcome is fair, no matter what.  This can’t be achieved in the general case 
for political justice, but Rawls believed it could be achieved in the special case of distributive 
justice.  If the game is set up fairly, no one can complain about the the justice of the resulting 
distribution.  This is what Hayek liked about A Theory of Justice. 
 Cited here as LN.  In the John Rawls Archives held at Harvard’s Pusey Library, HUM48, Box 24, Folder 8. I 9
am indebted to David Reidy for steering me there; to the library staff for its assistance in locating the 
material and making a copy; and to Rawls’s literary executors, Tim Scanlon and Mardy Rawls, for 
permission to use them.
  The freedom of conscience guaranteed by the principle of toleration marks the first of the three great 10
historical transitions Rawls emphasizes in the Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, the other two being 
“the establishment of constitutional regimes … and the winning of the working classes to 
democracy….” (LHPP 11).
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IV. Rawls on Madison 
We view society as a cooperative scheme for mutual advantage, —as a productive enterprise
— and we want a theory of how to set it up so that the distribution of its benefits will be 
accepted as fair, whatever it is.  Where does a theory of justice enter in?  A theory of justice 
has of course to serve as a standard for criticizing the operations and output of government; 
but has two additional tasks.  It has to explain why the constitution is complied with, and 
how it is stable over time.  Rawls looks to Madison as an example of how institutions having 
the goal of doing justice might best be set up.  Madison’s design for republican government 
relied on ambition rather than moral motives as its driving force.  By carefully dividing and 
arranging the organs of government, ambition was to check ambition, and the basic rights of 
citizens protected.  The danger to these rights, in Madison’s view, came from faction, that is, 
from the combination of like-minded ambitions seeking to advance their aims at, or even at, 
the expense of the interests and rights of others.  This is the genius of many familiar features 
of our constitutional system: federalism, separation of powers between the legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches, a bicameral legislature, the presidential veto.  But Madison 
also drew on social theory for further security against faction: the vast geographic extent of 
the new nation, its numerous population, and the difficulty of a majority coalition of factions 
and even the organization of a durable minority. 
Rawls imputes a certain theory of justice to Madison.  “Madison views government as 
protecting the inequalities in property and fortune that develop from the different natural 
talents of individuals.  His is a system of natural liberty. (Explain)” (LN; emphasis original). The 
explanation Rawls gave his students would have tracked the discussion of  the system of 
natural liberty in A Theory of Justice.  Given as an assumption that “the first principle of equal 
liberty is satisfied  and … the economy is roughly a free market system, although the means 11
of production may or may not be privately owned,” the system of natural liberty holds 
that a basic structure satisfying the principle of efficiency and in which positions are 
open to those able and willing to strive for them will lead to a just distribution … 
whatever this allocation turns out to be…. (TJ 57)  
Notice the attractive element of pure procedural justice in the system of natural liberty.  
  Presumably, without the first-principle guarantee of fair-value of the political liberties.  See TJ 197-99.  If 11
the fair-value guarantee is included in the first principle and, as such, introduced into the system of natural 




In A Theory of Justice Rawls faults the system of natural liberty for allowing distributive shares 
to be influenced by morally arbitrary factors like differences in natural endowments and 
social starting-points, which have cumulative effects over time.   I leave that criticism aside.  12
I want to emphasize what Rawls adds in the unpublished lecture.  Note that the system of 
natural liberty, as Rawls defines it, and as imputed to Madison, is agnostic on the property 
question.  The system of natural liberty “makes no effort to preserve an equality, or 
similarity, of social conditions, except so far as this is necessary to preserve the requisite background 
institutions” (TJ 62; emphasis mine).  So, again, the system of natural liberty —as defined— 
does not embrace “wide private property”: it does not mandate tolerance of private 
ownership of the means of production if tolerance would undermine the justice of 
background institutions.  But the system of natural liberty does not —so far as Rawls 
describes it— concern itself overmuch with the justice of the background institutions.  
Now, Rawls recognized that Madison was more committed than this to preserving the 
existing and evolving unequal distribution of ownership.  But holding to this commitment 
must generate factional conflict.  “These inequalities determine the main class divisions and 
set in motion the most violent political conflicts, the most opposed factions” (LN).  In Rawls’s 
reading, Madison is committed to controlling the effects rather than addressing the 
underlying causes of this virulent kind of discord, and committed to this “for the sake of 
liberty” (LN) —that is, for the sake of the liberty of the advantaged to accrue further 
advantages.  In summary: 
Thus the basic Madisonian conception is this: one relies upon (a) the extent of the 
country, the plurality of interests and numbers, and the difficulty of organization plus, 
(b) internal constitutional structures and elections to control faction, without any 
attempt to mitigate the causes of faction. (LN) 
Rawls notes Robert Dahl’s criticisms of Madison, but thinks there is a deeper problem.  
Dahl’s point was, essentially, that Madison does not show that his scheme is either necessary 
or sufficient to avoid tyranny.  But Rawls is struck by something else: that Madison’s implicit 
moral theory of the constitution makes the accumulation of private property as sacrosanct as 
personal conscience. 
  The system of natural liberty differs from Rawls’s justice as fairness in that justice as fairness replaces the 12
principle of efficiency with the difference principle and replaces the idea of “careers open to talents” with an 
interpretation of “equally open” as requiring a correction such that, regardless of other differences of natural 
and social endowment, individuals having comparable talents and ambitions have roughly equal 
opportunities.
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This is a startling oversight. The argument from liberty is very weak. Liberty of 
thought etc. is surely very different from the liberty over time of unlimited property 
accumulation under a system of natural liberty. It is the weakness of this argument that 
suggests [that it is a] rationalization — Madison’s constitutional theory as ideology … 
in special sense of Marx. (LN) 
Rawls did not seize this occasion to recapitulate the relative weaknesses of the system of 
natural liberty in the original position.  That is not the point.  The point is that Madison’s 
constitutional system is unstable.   The conception of justice that it offers is one that, over 13
time, will not inspire willing compliance with its institutions and laws.  Its institutions must 
rely on coercion rather than on a public conception that reasonable citizens would accept as 
their own.  Instead, it relies on countermajoritarian devices and the difficulties of 
coordinating an opposition to propertied interests to maintain itself.  It might be durable —
it has been durable— but it is not stable for the right reasons.  The right reason for stability is 
that citizens share a sense of justice, with reference to which they agree to advance their 
claims.  This is his summary: 
I believe that Madison’s constitutional system is either 
 (a) unstable, given to distributive conflict since causes of faction are not 
controlled, and moral sentiments cannot be effective for compliance, or 
 (b) It settles down eventually to a façade constitutional state in which the large 
owners of property do have effective control behind the scenes.  This control is made 
possible because of details of the constitutional structure and social forms.  E.g., 
  i) control of [the] political process via control of campaign funds 
  ii) control of news media 
  iii) control of economic processes, etc. (LN) 
The “social forms” Rawls refers to return us to the property question.  The property 
question cannot be deferred because two further tasks are now urgent: “(a) To characterize 
the conditions of background justice of the constitution and economic system” and “(b) To 
characterize the content of the required consensus,” that is, the principled consensus that 
  In Theory §37, “Limitations on the Principle of Participation,” Rawls discusses the various devices of 13
constitutionalism, but does not mention Madison (TJ 200-04).  He does reject appeals to the intensity of 
minority preference as a justification for limiting majority rule, and thus, implicitly, he also rejects 
Madison’s view as reconstructed by Robert Dahl (2006 [1956]).  According to Theory §54, “The Status of 
Majority Rule,” deciding whether constitutional constraints on majority rule “are effective and reasonable 
devices for strengthening the overall balance of justice” or are rather merely devices “used by entrenched 
minorities to preserve their illicit advantages” is a matter “of political judgment and does not belong to the 
theory of justice” (TJ 313).  In the lectures appended here, Rawls makes it clear that the theory of justice sits 
in judgment over matters that do not, strictly speaking, “belong” to it.
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serves as the public conception of justice.   Attention to background justice means that the 14
causes of faction have to be addressed: faction-containment and -management are not 
enough.  Moreover, constitutional theory will have to determine those “certain institutions 
and policies [that] are not a matter for discussion.  E.g. — having a state religion, slavery, 
etc.”  (LN)  Here is where the property question must be addressed.  
  
 a) the more stable conception of justice is to be preferred, ceteris paribus 
 b) this means those generating the stronger Sense of Justice when its     
 principles [are] satisfied, or more effective Sense of Justice. 
 c) This in turn depends on [the] tendency [of a]  system to generate interests    
 opposed to justice.  Here is where regulation of property and envy etc. comes    
 in.  And so the importance of background conditions (background justice). (LN) 
Let me conclude with a brief rehearsal of the reasons why the property question, posed at 
this stage, has to be answered decisively, and in favor of socialism.   
  Rawls weighs the objection that capitalism’s laws of development are incompatible with justice, and 14
frames the question of whether socialism is necessary to guarantee liberal background justice, in his 
unpublished “Outline: Liberalism and the New Politics,” HUM48, Box 24, Folder 8, in the Pusey Library. 
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Conclusion 
The property question can be taken off the table of ordinary legislation in either of two 
ways.  One, private ownership of the means of production can be protected as sacrosanct to 
the same degree as ownership of one’s body, or nearly so.  Wholly aside from the question 
whether justice would forbid, allow, or demand this entrenchment, Rawls has already 
rejected it as incompatible with stability and a sense of justice.  A sense of justice is a shared 
set of dispositions and motives grounded in a principle of reciprocity: inequalities must 
benefit all.  The system of natural liberty not only tolerates but enshrines inequalities 
without regard to whether they benefit the less-advantaged. 
The second way to take the property question off the table, as far as ordinary legislation 
goes, is to insist upon public ownership.  Just compensation of private owners will be the 
norm.  But in exceptional circumstance, justice does not demand that the expropriated be 
compensated.  Justice as fairness “requires that we move toward just institutions as speedily 
as the circumstances permit irrespective of existing sentiments.  A definite scheme of ideal 
institutions is embedded in its principles of justice” (TJ 396).   No one today —I hope it is 15
safe to say— thinks slaveholders in the old Confederacy were ripped off by the emancipation 
of their slaves. 
If the property question is left unanswered, the constitutional system inherits much of the 
“curious fragility” that Rawls saw in Madison’s scheme, aside from its potency as ideology.  If 
public versus private ownership of the means of production is always “a matter for 
discussion,” then what is held publicly will always attract private interests looking to turn it 
to private profit.  Publicly held, and privately held means of production that are taken into 
public ownership, are forever subject to privatization.   The motive for privatizing in a 16
property-owning democracy will sound laudable: we correct an insufficiency of private 
productive resources at the disposal the under-propertied, at the beginning of this and each 
“new period.”  But having to invoke that good motive is a sign that the goal of rendering the 
distribution of productive resources as a matter of pure procedural justice has gone by the 
board.   
Rawls was conscious that the constitutional framers would be forced to face the property 
question if other guarantees of background justice were unreliable.  In his 1971 lectures 
  Citing Theory §41, “The Concept of Justice in Political Economy.”15
  Settling the property question constitutionally is one thing, but keeping it settled is another.  For 16
example, the Portuguese constitution once declared that “all nationalizations effected since 25 April 1974 
are the irreversible conquests of the working class.”  But this settlement came undone when its institutional 
guarantor (the Council of Revolution) was dissolved.  See Finn (2017, 7).
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(Lecture XVII) he asked “What devices —conditions— [are] needed for [a] just 
constitution?” and listed eight.  The first six included public subsidies to parties and 
candidates, campaign spending limitations, political education and support for media 
discussion, elections by lottery, and the cultivation of a financially independent cadre of 
administrative professionals.  These six can be described as “insulation strategies”: they ignore 
the property question and consider the actual pattern of distribution of wealth and income as 
given. 
   
 The seventh device goes beyond insulation and attempts to manage distribution.  
  
7. Fragmentation of producer and property interests by progressive inheritance tax   
(at receiver’s end) and anti-trust laws, rejection of import quotas, etc. if private   
ownership is allowed. (LN) 
It is surprising that the characteristic device of “property-owning democracy” is 
unmentioned.  A property-owning democracy, as Rawls described it, pays attention to the 
distribution of productive assets and strives to makes sure that each citizen has enough: 
“sufficient productive means … to be fully cooperating members on a footing of 
equality” (JF 140).  Property-owning democracy is supposed to realize the ambition to treat 
distributive justice in a constitutional democracy as a matter of pure procedural 
(“background”) justice.  (I note that a distribution that is supposed to be seen as just, 
whatever it is, owing to how it arose, does not seem realizable by a process defined in terms 
of a portmanteau of sufficiency and equality.)  Rawls was later to acknowledge doubts that a 
property-owning democracy could be administered within the boundaries of public reason.  
Completing his lecture list was  
8. If necessary, limitation or abandonment of private property in [the] means of   
production. (LN) 
It is possible that Rawls thought of property-owning democracy as the “limitation” of private 
ownership of the means of production and of socialism as the “abandonment.”  But it is also 
possible that the phrase “limitation or abandonment” was intended simply to mark the 
permanent possibility of some “state of exception” —such as civil war  or natural disaster— 17
that might demand a suspension of the constitutional norm. 
  During the US Civil War, the federal sovereign initiated a massive transfer of public lands to private 17
ownership.  All told, an area equivalent in size to California plus twice Texas was privatized.  See Allen 
(forthcoming).
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The concept of the means of production is easily integrated into the conception of society as 
a fair system of productive cooperation for mutual benefit.  The concept also has a desirable 
salience.  Most of us can readily agree that we need a common currency, national defense, a 
transportation network, utilities and sanitation, and so forth, to be productive citizens.  If we 
live in coal country, we need a job in the mines in order to live.  If we live in the city, we 
need internet access and access to social networks and search engines.  Public ownership of 
these major and essential means of living can give an assurance that a principle of reciprocity 
informs the institutions and laws that we might otherwise reasonably view as coercive 
impositions.  It can also more readily be appreciated as the realization of pure procedural 
justice. 
There is certainly a case to be made that keeping the property question open and in play can 
have Pareto-superior incentive effects.   But, as Rawls insisted, justice is one thing and 
efficiency is another.  Madison’s scheme leaves the property question open; but at the same 
time it places structural obstacles in the way of any serious move away from private 
ownership.   Madison’s underlying thought may have been that America was extensive 
enough to make everyone rich, and anyway the not-so-rich would be unable to organize any 
very troubling resistance.  And if that was his idea, it has been prescient —so far.  Rawls 
thought this scheme “curiously fragile” perhaps because, at some foreseeable point, the left-
behinds would begin to notice they and many others were being left behind, and would cease 
to see their common predicament as contributing to their own and their children’s greater 
well-being.   In this, Rawls might prove to be at least as prescient, judging from where we 18
now stand, as Madison was, judging from the standpoint of 1789. 
  See Przeworksi (2018,  99): “perhaps for the first time in 200 years many people believe that their 18
offspring will not lead better lives than they do. Moreover, at least in the United States, this belief is 
validated by the facts: the proportion of children who at the age of 30 enjoy incomes higher than their 
parents had at the same age has been falling steadily and precipitously over the past five decades….  the 
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APPENDIX: FROM RAWLS’S PHILOSOPHY 171 LECTURES, THEORY OF DEMOCRACY, FALL 1971 
[Note: What appears below is my transcription of Rawls’s original handwritten lecture notes, 
which are housed in the Rawls Archive at Harvard’s Pusey Library.  In 1977, Rawls adopted 
the habit of distributing typed, mimeographed versions of his lectures to students (LHMP 
xv).  But as far as I have been able to determine, Rawls did not type up, “ditto,” or 
mimeograph the two lectures that appear below.  Also, so far as I am aware, Rawls did not 
deliver these or similar lectures again.  One likely, but only partial, explanation is that Rawls 
believed that fairness to writers in our tradition generally requires careful attention to the 
problems they thought needed to be addressed, which we must not simply assume were 
identical to the ones we now find or would then have found pressing.  Having neither time 
nor occasion to state Madison’s view in its best form, (see LHPP xiii) Rawls might have 
decided not to use Madison again as a foil in presenting justice as fairness.] 
LECTURE: XVII  — THEORY OF COMPETITIVE PLURALISM (I) 
1. Two Topics: under Theory of Democracy: 
 a) Theory of Competitive Pluralism - Dahl, Schumpeter, Barry 
 b) Principle (and value) of participation - Mill - Hegel - Marx 
   This week do a). 
2. Notion of Invisible Hand: History 
 a) In Adam Smith - to Walras - to Arrow - Hahn Competitive Equilibrium Analysis 
  (note slow development of this history). 
 b) In Hume: Essays on the Science of Politics - Madison - to Dahl, etc. and Economic   
  Theory of Democracy - Schumpeter - Downs, etc. 
3. What is this Idea? 
 a) Special case of the Artificial Identification Interests 
 b) Given a certain framework, arranged by the legislator (Bentham), 
 mutually disinterested agents will act (upshot their actions) to achieve social optimum 
 (in some sense by definition), although: 
  i) no central plan 
  ii) not their intention; or even 
  iii) not understood by them; provided that:  
  iv) certain conditions obtain. 
4. General Case: 
 a) social optimum is efficiency 
 b) competitive prices provide information  
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  (given certain conditions) 
 c) no contrast - contra Halevy,- between natural and artificial identification in    
  Bentham. 
5. Surprising Result: 
 a) This result is contrary to common sense, which would expect chaos, or 
 b) Need for central, public plan; or command of some central agency. 
6. How to treat this result? 
 a) As usual scientific approximation and simplification? 
  Not best way (Arrow-Hahn) 
 b) As asking this question: 
  i) Could this proposition be true? If so, under what conditions? How much   
  weight can they carry? 
 c) These questions are the point of competitive equilibrium analysis (Arrow Hahn) 
Political Case:  the Theory of Constitutional Democracy 
1. Here the analogous idea is applied to constitutional systems: How to design it so that   
 mutually disinterested political actors are lead [sic] to produce a social optimum, 
 i) no central plan 
 ii) not their intention 
 iii) perhaps the social optimum is not understood by them. 
2. Here, let’s ask: 
 a) could this proposition be true; and if so, under what conditions? 
 b) how robust are the necessary assumptions; and etc. as before. 
3. But here what is the social optimum? 
 a) in the economic case, it is efficiency 
 b) but here, what?  Certainly not efficiency?  And also 
 c) what sort of procedural justice do we expect here? 
4. Three types of procedural justice 
 a) perfect 
 b) imperfect 
 c) pure, each with respect to some optimum  
   The economic case is: perfect with respect to efficiency. 
5. Political case: 
 a) surely with respect to e.g., justice or some other social ideal, if at all. 
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 b) If we say justice, then: 
6. The following seems necessary: 
 a) We need a theory of justice - to say what this end is, and how determined, etc. 
 b) We cannot have better than imperfect procedural justice. The constitution is at best a 
 case of this sort. There exists no theory of the invisible hand. 
 c) Therefore, the theory of constitutional democracy would ask: 
  i) what devices and conditions are likely to render constitutional democracy   
  more perfect? 
  ii) how robust are these devices? And how stable are they? 
7. In A Theory of Justice I suggest 
 a) The stability and viability of constitutional democracy depends to some extent on a   
 sense of justice (public and shared) as well as on certain conditions. This is not a case   
 of artificial identification [of interests]! 
 b) No way to do without this - given e.g. Presidential Powers - and this reliance   
 necessarily renders imperfect [procedural justice], given difficulties of applying a   
 conception of justice - versus maximizing profits - plus human failures - injustices,   
 etc. 
8. Marx’s criticisms of constitutional democracy: There are at least two different sorts: 
 a) Marx rejects competitive idea as necessarily involving alienation.  What is wanted is  
 a publicly known and accepted central plan. (Thus [he] rejects competitive socialism   
 too) 
 b) In history, constitutional democracy is actually government in favor of the capitalist 
 class.  [It] represents class interests. 
 c) About a) we discussed a bit last time. (Repeat here some items from Friday’s class) 
 d) About b), there is much truth in this, and the theory of constitutional democracy   
 should [?] study what devices [are] necessary to prevent this. 
9. What devices —conditions— [are] needed for [a] just constitution? 
 1. Federal government financing [of] political parties, and of political activity. Forbid   
 private contributions. 
 2. Federal government financing of general political information: news, television,   
 media, etc. on a continuing basis. 
 3. Combination of running for office plus lottery is possible. 
 4. Public financing and collection etc. of product quality information in lieu of   
 advertising which is forbidden in normal form. Public consumer reports. Aim: to   
 enhance market performance. 
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 5. Public support of “political professionals” so they are not dependent on private   
 interests, or [on] their own wealth; or limited to a special profession —e.g., lawyers,   
 cf. Weber [? Soc] 1447H (vol. III). 
 6. Congress to have independent monitoring agencies to check performance [of]   
 executive branch agencies. 
 7. Fragmentation of producer and property interests by progressive inheritance tax   
 (at receiver’s end) and anti-trust laws, rejection of import quotas, etc. if private   
 ownership is allowed. 
 8. If necessary, limitation or abandonment of private property in [the] means of   
 production. 
LECTURE XVIII — THEORY OF COMPETITIVE PLURALISM (II) 
1. Introduction 
 1. Last time I took up the idea of constitutional systems parallel to the idea of    
 economic systems.  I considered the idea that as the latter is a case of perfect    
 procedural justice which achieves economic efficiency; so the former is a case of   
 imperfect procedural justice that is to achieve just legislation and social policies. 
 2. In each case it [is] supposed that the full intellectual understanding of these systems 
 is a very complicated affair.  Even in the economic case, studied for the longest time   
 in a rigorous way, it is very incomplete, still.  Certainly the political case is even more   
 complicated. 
 3. Today I should like to discuss — in a vague and intuitive way — some problems   
 about the constitutional system, and the theory of it.  In particular, I want to consider 
 the role of a theory of justice in this constitutional theory: where does it enter in? 
2. Theory of Justice Defines the Necessary Criteria 
 1. Throughout I assume some theory of justice, e.g. Justice as Fairness, will serve   
 best.  But there may be a dispute about this.  Then substitute some other view —   
 utilitarianism, etc.  The point is: we need, I believe, some ethical theory. 
 2. Given this theory of justice, then it defines the need[ed] criteria (parallel to the   
 principle of Pareto efficiency).  Thus if [we] think of procedure and result, [we] need a   
 theory to define both: 
   (a) just constitutional procedure; and 
   (b) just legislative or policy result. 
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3. This task is likely to be more complicated than the economic parallel.  Justice is a far more 
complicated notion than efficiency; [it] includes many more aspects. 
4. But this way of putting it —emphasizing complexity— is perhaps misleading.  And in any 
case, simply frightens us without saying how best to proceed.  It is more helpful to say that 
we seek a theory of justice that can be fitted into, conjoined with, social theory.  The moral 
notions should preferably be expressed in ways that allow them to become a part of the social 
theory, or one total theory with that. 
5. Thus e.g. the definition of Pareto efficiency fits in nicely with indifference curves etc., and 
allows one to prove some nice results.  No doubt much of its attraction lies here. 
6. So [we] want to set up in an analogous way, if we can.  Use primary social goods in 
defining principles, etc.  Then perhaps with suitable complications, they can become the 
moral part of a constitutional theory. 
B. Criticism of Madison 
 1. Assume [we] need [a] theory [of] justice to define requisite criteria.  But what else?  
 At least two things: 
  (a) To explain why constitutional rules are complied with 
  (b) To explain the stability properties of the constitutional system, or the lack   
  thereof. 
 Thus so far, 3 purposes [of the] theory of justice. 
 2. Let’s illustrate these points by Madison.  Recall some of the main theses as follows 
  (a) Justice is the end of government and society 
   (This uses [the] 1st aim [of the] theory of justice.  Madison [is] not   
   precise on its meaning) 
  (b) Aim is to secure Republican [sic] Government 
  (c) Every basic agency [of] government is to have its means of preserving   
  itself. 
  (d) Ambition is made to counter ambition. 
  (e) Moral motives are weak and unreliable 
  (f) Devices supporting competitive political process by controlling faction 
   (i) extent and numbers of the country 
   (ii) Difficulties of knowledge and organization. 
   (iii) Constitutional structures 
    a) representation 
    b) separation [of] powers 
    c) bicameralism 
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    d) federalism 
   (iv) elections 
3. Now how is all of this supposed to work?   
(Here we ask a question raised by Dahl.)  Or, same thing, why are the internal 
(constitutional) checks effective?   
Here I think Madison believes: that: 
 the constitutional rules will be followed. 
Thus, vetos (Presidential) will prevent certain legislation etc. 
4. But we must ask the question: 
 a) Why are the rules complied with? 
 b) and if they are felt as constraints, why aren’t they changed? Amended by    
 constitutional procedures? 
Parallel to the economic case, why do firms comply with the postulated rules?  Here, I believe 
some adherence to a political conception is important. (I will come back to this) 
5. Let’s note that another aspect of Madison’s system makes this question especially acute.  
(This [is] not mentioned by Dahl). Namely the underlying sociology.  These theses. 
 a) Madison views government as protecting the inequalities in property and fortune that   
 develop from the different natural talents of individuals.  His is a system of natural   
 liberty. (Explain) 
 b) These inequalities determine the main class divisions and set in motion the most   
 violent political conflicts, the most opposed factions. 
 c) Still, for the sake of liberty, one must control not the causes but the effects of faction. 
6. Thus the basic Madisonian conception is this:  one relies upon (a) the extent of the country, 
the plurality of interests and numbers, and the difficulty of organization plus, (b) internal 
constitutional structures and elections to control faction, without any attempt to mitigate the 
causes of faction. 
7. This is a startling oversight.  The argument from liberty is very weak.  Liberty of thought 
etc. is surely very different from the liberty over time of unlimited property accumulation 
under a system of natural liberty.  It is the weakness of this argument that suggests [that it is a] 
rationalization — Madison’s constitutional theory as ideology 
 Note: on meaning of ideology in special sense of Marx. 
8. I believe that Madison’s constitutional system is either 
 (a) unstable, given to distributive conflict since causes of faction are not controlled,   
 and moral sentiments cannot be effective for compliance, or 
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 (b) It settles down eventually to a façade constitutional state in which the large   
 owners of property do have effective control behind the scenes.  This control is made   
 possible because of details of the constitutional structure and social forms.  E.g., 
  i) control of [the] political process via control of campaign funds 
  ii) control of news media 
  iii) control of economic processes, etc. 
9. Thus Madison’s scheme brings out these other roles of justice: 
 (a) to explain adherence to rules 
 (b) to explain stability properties, or lack thereof 
D. Two Further Roles of [a] Theory [of] Justice: 
 1) There are two further roles that deserve mention: 
  (a) To characterize the conditions of background justice of the constitution and   
  economic system. 
  (b) To characterize the content of the required consensus. 
 2. The need for the first is already illustrated by the failure of Madison’s constitutional 
 system and the need to control the causes of faction.  Thus to secure justice so that such 
 factions as exist are those that would arise under conditions of background justice.    
 E.g., Equality of Opportunity and the Difference Principle. 
 3. It is part of stability (explain notion of stability of justice, appended) theory to   
 argue that under these conditions the violence of faction is less and the adherence to   
 the rules (from the Sense of Justice) more effective.  And if possible, sufficiently   
 effective. 
 4. The need for the second ([reflective] consensus) is that in a just constitutional   
 regime certain institutions and policies are not a matter for discussion.  E.g. — having 
 a state religion, slavery, etc. Here this is not always so.  Example of Lincoln-Douglas   
 debates.  Need a theory [of] justice to 
  (a) characterize this consensus, its underlying principles 
  (b) work out its role in the constitutionals process. 
Note on [the] Stability of Justice 
 1. Equilibrium and stability definitions 
  a) Equilibrium of systems 
  b) Stability — of equilibrium 
 2. Stability with respect to justice 
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  a) applies to equilibria of just systems 
  b) means: such systems generate their own support 
  c) does not mean [that] institutions [are] always unchanged. 
 3. Re: choosing theories of justice 
  a) the more stable conception  of justice is to be preferred, ceteris paribus 
  b) this means those generating the stronger Sense of Justice when its    
  principles [are] satisfied, or more effective Sense of Justice. 
  c) This in turn depends on [the] tendency [of a]  system to generate interests   
  opposed to justice.  Here is where regulation of property and envy etc. comes   
  in.  And so the importance of background conditions (background justice). 
E. Conclusion 
 Thus I agree with Dahl that Madison’s constitutional system is a curiously fragile   
 notion: in that 
 (a) [Neither the] necessity of [the] separation of powers, nor the sufficiency of it in his   
 framework, to avoid tyranny is shown.  [There is an] excessive reliance on    
 constitutional devices and structures. 
 (b) There is a failure to provide the necessary social conditions and background   
 conditions: to 
  i) control faction 
  ii) ensure effective consensus. 
 [We] still lack a worked out conception of a viable and just constitutional system. 
  
